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How not to factor a miracle∗
Derek K. Wise
Mathematics is a bit like Zen, in that its greatest masters are likely to deny there being any
succinct expression of what it is. It may seem ironic that the one subject which demands absolute
precision in its definitions would itself defy definition, but the truth is, we are still figuring out
what mathematics is. And the only real way to figure this out is to do mathematics.
Mastering any subject takes years of dedication, but mathematics takes this a step further: it
takes years before one even begins to see what it is that one has spent so long mastering. I say
“begins to see” because so far I have no reason to suspect this process terminates. Neither do wiser
and more experienced mathematicians I have talked to.
In this spirit, for example, The Princeton Companion to Mathematics [PCM], expressly re-
nounces any tidy answer to the question “What is mathematics?” Instead, the book replies to this
question with 1000 pages of expositions of topics within mathematics, all written by top experts in
their own subfields. This is a wise approach: a shorter answer would be not just incomplete, but
necessarily misleading.
Unfortunately, while mathematicians are often reluctant to define mathematics, others are not.
In 1960, despite having made his own mathematically significant contributions, physicist Eugene
Wigner defined mathematics as “the science of skillful operations with concepts and rules invented
just for this purpose” [W]. This rather negative characterization of mathematics may have been
partly tongue-in-cheek, but he took it seriously enough to build upon it an argument that mathemat-
ics is “unreasonably effective” in the natural sciences—an argument which has been unreasonably
influential among scientists ever since.
What weight we attach to Wigner’s claim, and the view of mathematics it promotes, has
both metaphysical and practical implications for the progress of mathematics and physics. If the
effectiveness of mathematics in physics is a ‘miracle,’ then this miracle may well run out. In this
case, we are justified in keeping the two subjects ‘separate’ and hoping our luck continues. If, on
the other hand, they are deeply and rationally related, then this surely has consequences for how
we should do research at the interface.
In fact, I shall argue that what has so far been unreasonably effective is not mathematics but
reductionism—the practice of inferring behavior of a complex problem by isolating and solving
manageable ‘subproblems’—and that physics may be reaching the limits of effectiveness of the
reductionist approach. In this case, mathematics will remain our best hope for progress in physics,
by finding precise ways to go beyond reductionist tactics.
Is physics unreasonably well described in the language invented for that purpose?
The essence of Wigner’s claim, based an unsupported characterization of mathematics as an elab-
orate mental game that has nothing a priori to do with physics, is that mathematics is somehow
nonetheless amazingly effective in describing physics. Were physics and mathematics disjoint en-
deavors, one empirical, one cognitive and largely arbitrary, then it would indeed be astounding,
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even ‘miraculous,’ to find them interacting as fruitfully and precisely as they do. But this viewpoint
disregards both history and the mathematical biases set up by our place in the natural world.
First, historically, the distinction between mathematics and physics is relatively recent, with the
movement toward ‘pure’ mathematics progressing gradually since the 18th century. The historical
counterargument to Wigner’s thesis has been taken up by mathematics historians [GG] in detail,
and that is not my purpose here. However, it is worth pointing out that, for example, calculus
and a large part of differential equations—still among the physicist’s most important tools—were
designed precisely for physical applications. It is at least anachronistic, but bordering on absurd,
to claim these are unduly effective in the very subject they owe their existence to.
In fact, the joint development of physics and mathematics predates the recognition of physics
as a separate science. I must agree with Einstein that “mathematics generally, and particularly
geometry, owes its existence to the need which was felt of learning something about the relations
of real things to one another,” and that “we may in fact regard [geometry] as the most ancient
branch of physics” [E].
Second, at a deep level, mathematics—or rather our limited view of it—is founded on our
perception of the natural world. To get an idea of how much our view of mathematics depends on
physics, we need not imagine a world with drastically different physical laws: we can simply consider
our own world at different scales, where subtle physical phenomena become readily apparent.
If we were very large mathematicians, or equivalently if Newton’s gravitational constant G were
large, Einstein’s famous curving of space and time would be noticeable on the scale of everyday
life. With no rigid spatial backdrop, and no independence of ‘space’ and ‘time’ on ordinary scales,
we would at least have a very different history of geometry.
Mathematics would be much more radically different if instead we were very small mathemati-
cians, or equivalently if Planck’s constant ~, which regulates the level of ‘quantum fuzziness,’ were
large. This would also have affected our ideas of geometry, since there would be no stationary
objects with well-defined positions to serve as reference points for measurements. But also, we
may well have developed little interest in numbers or counting, since distinct collections of objects
become much less sensible at quantum scales. We would thus have less motivation to invent number
theory, set theory, or combinatorics. These subjects, fundamental as they are to mathematics as
we know it, enjoy this status because of our place within the natural world.
Moreover, as ‘quantum mathematicians’ we would presumably prove theorems not according to
the familiar rules of logic, which are deeply tied to set theory, but according to rules of quantum
logic, which reflect the fuzzy, indistinct nature of propositions about fundamentally quantum me-
chanical systems. Likewise, our foundational notions of probability and statistics would necessarily
be quantum in nature.
More radical still, we can consider a scenario in which G and ~ are both large, corresponding to
a realm of experience where effects of ‘quantum gravity’ should be evident. Here the foundations
of mathematics would surely differ even more radically from our usual ones, in ways that one can
only speculate on depending on which approach to quantum gravity, if any, one believes.
While it is interesting to consider how our foundations of mathematics are determined by
physics, it is in fact recognized from a perspective entirely within pure mathematics that mathe-
matics itself could be built on alternative foundations. This goes beyond the philosophy of math-
ematics to what we might call the mathematics of mathematics, in that the types of foundations
of mathematics—different ‘mathematical worlds’ with their own notions of logic—can be classified
mathematically. For example, the potential ‘mathematical foundations’ with many of the same
formal properties as the usual set-based foundations are classified by topos theory. This motivates
attempts to use topos theory in the foundations of physics [I].
If our experience of the physical world were different, then we would have invented very different
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mathematics, but it would still be mathematics. It would still be quite effective at describing the
world it was built to represent—presumably even more effective in treating certain phenomena.
Appropriate abstraction
Of course, one might object that while some mathematics has been invented specifically for physical
applications, it remains surprising that ‘abstract’ mathematics seems to keep finding its way back
into physics. In fact, this confusion arises when we erroneously conflate the precise definition of
‘abstract’ with its colloquial one.
Outside of mathematical or philosophical discussions, when people call a thing ‘abstract,’ they
may only mean it is difficult to understand, or even unnecessarily cerebral. But true abstraction is
just the opposite: a path to clarity. It means stripping away all inessential details, arriving at an
idealization whose life purpose is to exemplify the properties or concepts under consideration, and
nothing else. Russell used the word in this sense when he said the language of physics is necessarily
abstract, in order to “say as little as the physicist means to say.”
This raises a key question: How does one arrive at a good mathematical abstraction? It is
perhaps not surprising that we can find useful mathematical abstractions of the simplest objects
in our experience; ultimately, our ability to find good mathematical abstractions of concepts in
physics, especially as compared to other sciences, must rest on physics being much simpler than
other sciences.
Much more surprising—and I gather this is the part Wigner also finds incredible—is the ability
to ‘stay’ at an abstract mathematical level, not referring back to direct physical experience, and still
somehow manage to arrive at new mathematical constructs which later turn out to have applications
to physics.
So, let us ask: Where do new mathematical concepts come from? Sadly, Wigner is again rather
dismissive on this point, claiming that most advanced mathematical concepts are defined just so
that the mathematician can “demonstrate his ingenuity and sense of formal beauty.” [W]
In fact, defining new concepts in mathematics is a delicate art, and evidently one of the hardest
to master. Whereas a decent Ph.D. student in mathematics will be able to prove some quite difficult
theorems—this is the most obvious skill that a graduate education in mathematics teaches—there
is typically no training on what makes a good definition. Finding the right definitions is simply
too advanced. Some definitions, once one recognizes a need for them, are rather obvious. But in
many cases, it takes years for a community of mathematicians to agree on the best definition for a
concept.
To understand what makes a good mathematical definition, it is of course best to study many
examples. Here I will consider just one, but deliberately choose an example that does not yet have
well-established physical applications. One of my current favorite examples is the notion of quantum
groupoid, also called a Hopf algebroid [B, D-S]. Groupoids are a modern mathematical way to study
symmetry—arguably the most important concept in mathematical physics. Intuitively, quantum
groupoids result from taking the concept of groupoid, based on sets and hence classical logic, and
importing it into the world of vector spaces and hence quantum logic.
But realizing this intuitive idea and settling on a definition of quantum groupoid took hard
work. The definition that finally emerged looks quite complicated and, frankly, esoteric from the
perspective of an outsider showing up on the scene after the dust has settled. It is much more
complicated than what I would instinctively try, or what researchers did in fact try first. If you
handed me the definition of quantum groupoid out of the blue, I would think it very unlikely to be
useful in physics.
So, what makes this definition ‘good’ or ‘correct’ in some sense? Consider this evidence:
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• The definition naturally relates mathematical structures with many known applications, in-
cluding ‘groupoids’ and ‘quantum groups.’
• More naive attempts at the definition were refined by the need to include natural examples.
• Despite being rather complicated, equivalent definitions were discovered independently by
researchers with quite different starting points, from within different subfields of mathematics.
Notice that all of this evidence for the definition’s quality (and more could be listed) is purely
mathematical, and none of it is based on our desire to “demonstrate [our] ingenuity and sense of
formal beauty.” On the contrary, the evidence gives a strong sense that this is a robust mathemat-
ical concept. Together with the tight relationship to concepts with known physical applications
which one may naturally want to combine, this makes me think physical applications for quantum
groupoids may not be so far-fetched after all.
Ways of ignoring
Of course, the simpler a physical system is, the more likely we can find an appropriate mathe-
matical abstraction of it, and in practice we do not model the entire system of interest but some
simplification of it. The idea that we can study a complicated system by isolating certain aspects of
it to focus on is known as reductionism. This brings us to what I argue has truly been ‘unreasonaly
effective’ in physics.
We will need to distinguish between two types of reductionism. At a basic level, reductionism
means ignoring nearly everything in the universe. But there are different ways of ignoring: it is
one thing to ignore most of the things in the universe, and quite another to ignore most of the
properties of the things in the universe. For clarity, I will call the first of these reductionism and
the second co-reductionism. Both play foundational roles in physics, so it is worth taking some
time to understand them in detail.
Mathematically, the difference between these two types of ignoring corresponds to the difference
between sub-objects and quotient objects. A sub-object is essentially what it sounds like: a smaller
piece of some other object. A particular subset of set of all people is the set containing only Eugene
Wigner, and this can be represented as an arrow from the subset into the whole set, indicating how
the part is included in the whole:
→
We engage in reductionism when we focus in on a sub-object, for example, to study Wigner as an
individual. Of course, if our goal is to write a biography, we care not just about the Wigner but
also his place in the set of all people—that is where the arrow comes in. However, our main subject
is Wigner, and we ignore all other people at least insofar as they do not interact with Wigner.
Quotient objects are less familiar, but are easy to understand by examples. A particular quotient
of the set of all people is the set of genders. This can be represented as arrow going from the whole
set to the quotient set:
♀ ♂→
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The arrow simply represents assignment of the appropriate gender to each person. Here we are not
ignoring any people, but rather ignoring nearly everything about all of them.
Mathematicians have a nice way to think of this: the arrow is thought of as a process in which we
“identify”—declare to be identical—any two source elements that map to the same target element.
In the example, we imagine that Wigner and I, by virtue of being both male, are identified: we
become the same person according to a vastly oversimplified model where the only distinguishing
feature of a person is gender.
It is important to distinguish between ‘sub-’ and ‘quotient’ constructions. For example, ♀ and♂ do not refer to particular people, so it would be wrong to think of {♀,♂} as a ‘subset’ of the set
of people; it is a quotient. (Confusing this quotient with a subset may be the closest I can come to
a mathematically rigorous definition of sexism.)
Reduction and co-reduction in fundamental physics
Every scientific field uses reductionism and co-reductionism, usually a mixture of both, for obvious
reasons: It would be impossible to get off ground in any study without confining our attention to
only some of the relevant things, or to some of their relevant properties.
Often, of necessity, we ignore what cannot be justifiably ignored, and settle for idealized models
drastically simpler than the systems we are really interested in. While this remains a useful tool in
all sciences, in physics it appears to be much more. If physicists are envied by other scientists, it
is because the information they ignore has so often turned out to be perfectly justified, at least to
within the limits of very precise measurements.
Reductionism has succeeded in fundamental physics because matter really does appear to be
composed of indivisible and completely identical parts. While the properties of one person imply
very little about people in general, the properties of one electron appear to tell us everything about
all other electrons—the are indistinguishable in minutest detail. Beginning with the atomic theory,
and continuing with the discovery of subatomic particles, and finally to the list of about 17 observed
particles that physicists now take to be fundamental, we now have built up an astonishingly precise
picture of matter—a reductionist’s dream, with a finite set of building blocks and neat rules on
how to combine them.
At the other end of the spectrum, what I have called co-reductionism plays a key role in the
other fundamental pillar of modern physics, general relativity. In general relativity we ignore almost
all properties of matter, considering only its mass. Remarkably, this again seems to be more than
a practical convenience: gravity really does not seem to care about other properties of matter in
the least.
What seems quite miraculous about this whole situation is that gravity, the one force that is
so weak that one only notices it when there is a lot of matter around, is also the one force entirely
unconcerned with any distinguishing properties of that matter: it seems to care only about mass
and location of that mass.
Quantum gravity, the attempt to combine general relativity with quantum physics, faces a
dilemma, since these theories involve orthogonal types of ‘ignoring.’ Most approaches to the problem
can be classified into one of two scenarios. In one scenario, we try to make gravity more like the rest
of physics, for example by studying elementary particles that carry the gravitational interaction
(‘gravitons’) or frameworks to generalize them. In the other scenario, we attempt to apply principles
of quantum physics, which in fact we know entirely from the world of particles, to the relativistic
picture of space and time.
In other words, either we attempt to augment a theory arrived at by reductionist tactics to
include a theory arrived at by co-reductionist tactics, or the other way around. Neither seems
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obviously bound to work. If our luck does run out, it will be a failure of reductionism, and not of
mathematics. In fact, the precise and structural ways of thinking provided by mathematics will be
our best hope to surpass this obstacle.
Factoring a miracle
I have argued that what is truly surprising in physics is not that mathematics is effective in physics,
but rather that reductionist strategies work so well, for apparently purely physical reasons. There
is also a deeper sense of reductionism lying at the heart of Wigner’s argument, and the worldview
we are led to if we take it seriously.
On the surface, Wigner’s claim that mathematics is unreasonably effective in physics seems
related to Einstein’s famous statement about the world being amazingly comprehensible. But
taken in context, it is clear Einstein does not wonder at the comprehensibility of the world in some
metaphysical sense, but rather that the world is comprehensible to us:
That the totality of sensory experience is such that it can be organized
through thinking . . . is a fact that we can only marvel at, but which we will
never be able to comprehend. We can say: the eternally incomprehensible
thing about the world is its comprehensibility.
Dass die Gesamtheit der Sinneserlebnisse
so beschaffen ist, dass sie durch das Denken
. . . geordnet werden ko¨nnen, ist eine Tatsache, u¨ber
die wir nur staunen, die wir aber niemals werden
begreifen ko¨nnen. Man kann sagen: Das ewig Un-
begreifliche an der Welt ist ihre Begreiflichkeit. [E2]
While it is impressive that one can get so far in principle with extracting mathematical structure
from the physical world, the shocking thing is that we have the mental capacity to do this in
practice. The real miracle is the complexity of the world relative to our own intelligence. This is
indeed cause to marvel. It is one thing for the universe to be sensible in some precise way, and
quite another for some entity within the universe to make sense of it to the extent we have.
The desire to ‘factor out’ the human element no doubt stems from reductionist tendencies,
where in this case the component we attempt to ignore is ourselves. I see no sensible way to do
this.
Acknowledgments
I am indebted to John Baez, Julian Barbour, David Corfield, and Paul Morris for conversations
and insights that have clarified my thinking on this subject, perhaps especially in ways that did
not impact this essay itself as much as they might have.
6
References
[B] G. Bo¨hm, Hopf Algebroids, in Handbook of Algebra Vol 6, ed. M. Hazewinkel, Elsevier,
2009, pp. 173-236.
[D-S] B. Day, R. Street, Monoidal bicategories and Hopf algebroids, Adv. Math. 129 (1997)
99–157.
[E] Albert Einstein, Geometry and Experience, address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences,
Berlin, Jan. 1921. English translation at
http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Extras/Einstein_geometry.html
[E2] Albert Einstein, Physik und Realita¨t, J. Franklin Inst. 221 (1936) 313–347.
[I] Chris J. Isham, Topos methods in the foundations of physics, in Deep Beauty: Understand-
ing the Quantum World through Mathematical Innovation, ed. H. Halvorson, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2011.
[PCM] The Princeton Companion to Mathematics, eds. Timothy Gowers, June Barrow-Green,
Imre Leader, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2008.
[GG] Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Solving Wigner’s mystery: The reasonable (though perhaps lim-
ited) effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, The Mathematical Intelligencer
30 (2008) no. 3, 7–17.
[W] Eugene Wigner, The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences,
Comm. Pure Appl. Math. 13 (1960) 1–14.
Department Mathematik, Friedrich-Alexander Universita¨t Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg, Cauerstraße 11, 91058 Erlangen, Germany.
Current address: Concordia University Saint Paul, 1282 Concordia Avenue, St. Paul, Minnesota 55104, USA.
derek.wise@fau.de
7
